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i 
William James1 prose works remain stimulating, not only because of 
the sensitivity of perception and depth of insight they reveal, but because of 
the lucidity and vigor of their style as well. With all his flair for stylistic 
expression, however, James wrote not one essay on prose style or his the-
ory and practice of aesthetics. Perhaps he judged it best not to examine too 
critically that which he seemed almost by nature to be able to do so well» 
It is not the wri ter ' s purpose, however, to discover why James never 
elaborated a theory of aesthetics, but to explore his writings (1) to reveal 
an important ingredient of his aesthetic views, his fear of pleasure for its 
own sake, (2) to present his thought on aesthetics, (3) to show how effective-
ly he used the metaphor to communicate knowledge of psychology or to ex-
press his ethical and religious vision and (4) to see how his view of aesthet-
ics fits his general notion of life and mind. Whatever else the reader wish-
es to see—the paradox of James1 simplified aesthetic theory and his highly 
skilled practice, the puritanical or genteel spirit revealed by the fear of 
pleasure or the moral orientation of a sc ient is ts writings—all this is the 
reader*s own business. The wri ter ' s business is to piece together James r 
brief and scattered statements about aesthetics and the pleasures of ar t and 
to refer to his arguments for pragmatism, for the ethical and active life, 
and for the religious vision in order to read the implications of these for 
James1 aesthetics. îf the reader will grant this reading by implication, he 
will not fail to see how, for James, worthwhile art had to function as a 
means of communicating knowledge and of stimulating ethical action and r e -
ligious thought. 
11 
It would be a mistake to think that James considered aesthetic plea-
sure as inherently good. He was certain, rather, that pleasure without 
practical purpose, even if it was aesthetic pleasure, meant the relaxation 
of control over one's creative powers and, hence, an inevitable softening 
of moral character. His attitude toward pleasure for its own sake is clear-
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ly illustrated in his opinion of a speech which Chief Justice Holmes deliv-
ered before the Bar Association of Boston. Holmes had said, among other 
things, that life was an end in itself and that the only question as to whether 
it was worth living was whether one could get enough of i t . 1 
James reacted strongly to the hedonistic ideas he thought the 
speech implied: TrItfs all right for once, in the exuberance 01 youth,rr he 
wrote to a friend, "to celebrate mere vital excitement, la joie de vivre, as 
a protest against humdrum solemnity. But to make it systematic, and op-
pose it, as an ideal and a duty, to the ordinarily recognized duties, is to 
pervert it altogether—especially when one is a Chief Justice. . . . Mere 
excitement is an immature ideal, unworthy of the Supreme Courtfs official 
endorsement. "^ 
Another example may serve to illustrate the extent of JamesT fear that 
too much pleasure might endanger oneTs character. In 1873, he wrote to 
his sister from Rome: "Italy is a very delightful place to dip into but no 
more . I can't imagine how, unless one is earnestly studying history in 
some way, it can in the long run help injuring all oneTs active powers. The 
weight of the past world here is fatal, —one ends by becoming its mere par-
asite instead of its equivalent. This worship, this dependence on other men 
is abnormal. The ancients did things by doing the business of their own day, 
not by gaping at their grandfather^ tombs, —and the normal man today will 
do likewise. "3 
The notion that the normal man would look to the business of his own 
day was quite in keeping with James1 conception of the importance of the ac-
tive, ethical life in a changing world. For him, the world was full of novel-
ty. One could accept the novelty and the consequent insecurity as a chal-
lenge to better living. On the other hand, one could attempt to escape by 
seeking safety in abstract systems which seemed to guarantee salvation 
from the very novelty and insecurity. The latter path, James asserted, 
was that of the rationalist. ^ James1 way, the way of the pragmatist, was 
to accept the universe as unsafe and to work for a salvation only possible 
but never guaranteed. Nowhere did he state his attitude more definitely 
than in "Pragmatism and Religion": "I find myself willing to take the uni-
verse to be reâlly dangerous and adventurous, without therefore backing 
out and crying Tno play*. . . . I am willing that there should be real losses 
and real losers, and no total preservation of all that i s . I can believe in 
the ideal as an ultimate, not as an origin, and as an extract, not the whole. 
When the cup is poured off, the dregs are left behind forever, but the pos-
sibility of what is poured off is sweet enough to accept. "^ 
And the nature of the "possibility" James spoke of? It was the very 
possibility a man had of putting into living practice "the ideals which he 
frames. " 6 These ideals were for James humanistically moral: "Must my 
thoughts dwell night and day on my personal sins and blemishes, " he asked 
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in the essay "Pragmatism's Conception of Truth," "because-I truly hâve 
them?—or may I sink and ignore them in order to be a decent social unit, 
and not a mass of morbid melancholy and apology?" ' To be a "decent so-
cial unit" seems to have been a major shaping force in James ! moralistic 
pragmatism. 
Art, in James 1 view, like other kinds of human thought and activity, 
had to serve a decent social function. Artistic celebration for the emotion-
al experience could hardly seem really worthy just as the celebration of 
life for its own sake was believed to be "immature" a too dependent love of 
historic Rome injurious to the "active powers, " and a worship of abstract 
systems something negative and unreal. His well-known comments on the 
subjects of "novel-reading, " "theatre-going" and "indulgence in music" are 
typical expressions of this attitude. James proposed that "no matter how 
good one's sentiments may be, if one have [sic] not taken advantage of ev-
ery concrete opportunity to act, one's character may remain entirely unaf-
fected for the better. " And he continued: 
Every time a resolve or a fine glow of feeling evapo-
rates without bearing practical fruit is worse than a 
chance lost. . . . There is no more contemptible 
type of human character than that of the nerveless 
sentimentalist and dreamer, who spends his life in a 
weltering sea of sensibility and emotion, but who nev-
er does a manly concrete deed. Rousseau, inflaming 
all the mothers of France, by his eloquence, to follow 
Nature and nurse their babies themselves, while he 
sends his own children to the foundling hospital, is the 
classical example of what I mean. . . . The habit of 
excessive novel-reading and theatre-going will p ro-
duce true monsters in this line. The weeping of a 
Russian lady over the fictitious personages in the 
play, while her coachman is freezing to death on his 
seat outside, is the sort of thing that everywhere hap-
pens on a less glaring scale. Even the habit of exces-
sive indulgence in music, for those who are neither 
performers themselves nor musically gifted enough to 
take it in a purely intellectual way, has probably a r e -
laxing effect upon the character. ^ 
If aesthetic pleasure by itself was to be shunned, however, it became 
valuable when it had a practical expression, when it stimulated construc-
tive ethical action in the life of the individual. That James was convinced 
of the importance of this function for art seems clear from his negative r e -
action in the passage just quoted to the enjoyment of ar t forms for the sake 
of pure pleasure. He made his conviction that lasting ar t survived largely 
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because of its moral value positively clear in a statement about "the extra-
ordinary tonic and consoling power" of the poetry of Dante and Wordsworth 
in his essay "Some Metaphysical Problems": "This need of an eternal mor-
al order, " he wrote, "is one of the deepest needs of our breast . And those 
poets, like Dante and Wordsworth, who live on the conviction of such an or-
der, owe to that fact the extraordinary tonic and consoling power of their 
verse . "^ But that James wished art to be what is more than a tonic and a 
consoling power, a stimulant to intellectual, moraL or religious human 
thought and action,will be discussed in more detail later in the paper, par-
ticularly by implication in his pairing of the ethical and aesthetic principles, 
in his belief that both these kinds of principle challenge a man to "translate" 
the raw materials of experience according to the "ideals he frames, " in ex-
amples of James1 use of the metaphor, in the consistency of the functional 
view of ar t with his notion of the usefulness of psychology and religion in 
improving human activity, and in his "pragmatic" reading of Whitman!s 
poem "To You. " 
I I ! 
James did not, as has been observed, elaborate a theory of aesthet-
ics . He did, however, in The Principles of Psychology briefly reveal what 
seemed to him to be the nature of the aesthetic principles. It is important 
to note that wherever in the work he spoke of the "aesthetic principles, " he 
also spoke of the "ethical principles" or "moral principles." 
He paired the two kinds of principle because he thought of them as be-
longing to the same inner world of human thought. Both were mental ab-
stractions not matched by any kind of observable equivalents in the natural 
world. Thus they were not ideas produced in us by observation of the outer 
world. 10 
Of the two kinds of principle, James rated the moral as being the 
more distant from the natural world: " . . . though nature !s materials lend 
themselves slowly and discouragingly to our translation of them into ethical 
forms, but more readily into aesthetic forms; to translation into scientific 
forms they lend themselves with relative ease and completeness."1 1 James 
established, thus, a three levelled hierarchy of ideality—the moral, the 
aesthetic and the scientific. 
The "aesthetic principles, " James thought, were "at bottom such ax-
ioms as that a note sounds good with its third and fifth, or that potatoes 
need salt"; that is "that when certain impressions come before our mind, 
one of them will seem to call for or repel the others as its companions."1^ 
He asserted that habit, the result of repeated awareness of the usual con-
junctions of outer objects or events, only to a very limited extent explained 
these "aesthetic connections" between mental " impressions." Since it was 
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"notorious how seldom natural experiences" measured "up to our aesthetic 
demands, " it was not possible to explain aesthetic tastes as mere results 
of habit formation. ^ 
Further , James held that many of the "so-called metaphysical princi-
ples" were based on aesthetic tastes or feelings: "Many of the so-called 
metaphysical principles are at bottom only expressions of aesthetic feeling. 
Nature is simple and invariable; makes no leaps, or makes nothing but 
leaps; is rationally intelligible; neither increases nor diminishes in quanti-
ty; flows from one principle, etc. e tc . , —what do all such principles ex-
press save our sense of how pleasantly our intellect would feel if it had a 
Nature of that sort to deal w i th?" 1 4 
James believed too that the moral and aesthetic abstractions had a 
distinct function. They caused a man to be always trying to reform the sub-
stance of the world around him, to make him more than an observer or an 
appreciator, a creative individual. Further, men wished to be creative be-
cause the consistencies between their ideas of what ought to be were so much 
more harmonious than the unpatterned realities of the natural world. "The 
world of aesthetics and ethics, " James wrote, "is an ideal world, a Utopia, 
a world which the outer relations persis t in contradicting, but which we as 
stubbornly persist in striving to make ac tua l . " 1 5 
The process of reform in response to either the moral or aesthetic 
challenge, James spoke of as a "translation" from the real into the ideal: 
"The translation, it is true, will probably never be ended. The perceptive 
order does not give way, nor the right conceptive substitute for it ar ise , at 
our bare word of command. It is often a deadly fight. But victory after 
victory makes us sure that the essential doom of our enemy is defeat."1** 
IV 
Most wri ters worthy of the name are skilled in the use of metaphor. 
Yet few scientists have been better known for their efforts to "translate" 
experience into the patterned consistencies of prose through the use of such 
techniques as the metaphor than was William James . The continued popu-
larity of The Principles of Psychology and The Varieties of Religious Expe-
rience attests not only to the freshness of James1 ideas but also to his abil-
ity to describe lucidly and colorfully in metaphorical manner his experience 
of life. An example taken from The Principles of Psychology illustrates the 
point. There he effectively likened his sense of the stream of conscious-
ness to the life of a bird: "As we take, in fact, a general view of the won-
derful stream of our consciousness, what strikes us first is this different 
pace of its par ts . Like a bird rs life, it seems to be made of an alternation 
of flights and perchings. " 1 7 
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Elsewhere James revealed forcefully his belief in the saving value of 
work, a belief consistent with his notion of the importance of the active, 
ethical life. His style was aimed at the layman. In a powerful metaphor 
used in TTWhat Pragmatism Means" he likened knowledge to cash; knowledge, 
like cash, was useful. Its very value lay in its usefulness in achieving a 
higher level of living, "a program for more work," a program for changing 
"existing real i t ies": " 'God, ' TMatter, ' 'Reason,1 'the Absolute, ' 'Energy, ' 
are so many solving names, You can res t when you have them. You are at 
the end of your metaphysical quest. But if you follow the pragmatic method, 
you cannot look on any such word as closing your quest. You must bring out 
of each word its practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of 
your experience. It appears less as a solution, then, than as a program for 
more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in which ex-
isting realities may be changed. " 1 8 
Much of the reason for the lasting power of James1 writing lies in its 
moving expression of the religious need in human life. One really striking 
use of metaphor for this effect occurs in The Varieties of Religious Experi-
ence in James ' description of the "sadness" that pervades every positivis-
tic, agnostic or naturalistic scheme of philosophy. So powerful is the ef-
fect of this metaphorical passage upon the reader* s imagination that he is 
pressed toward a new consideration of his own religious vision, toward an 
intellectual act of religious commitment or rejection: 
For naturalism, fed on recent cosmological specula-
tions, mankind is in a position similar to that of a set 
of people living on a frozen l§ke, surrounded by cliffs 
over which there is no escape, yet knowing that little 
by little the ice is melting, and the inevitable day 
drawing near when the last film of it will disappear, 
and to be drowned ignominiously will be the human 
creature 's portion. The merr ie r the skating, the 
warmer and more sparkling the sun by day, and the 
ruddier the bonfires at night, the more poignant the 
sadness with which one must take in the meaning of 
the total situation. ^ 
For James, all real human need—for knowledge, for work, for re l i -
gious vision—was known about in the beginning because it was felt in sensi-
ble experience. Reality for us, he believed, lay essentially in that experi-
e n c e . ^ Any human thought or activity which did not function there was not 
ultimately worthwhile. So, of rationalistic philosophy James disapproved 
in "The Thing and Its Relations" because it led the thinker away from sen-
sible experience, because for it "those intellectual products are most true 
which, turning their face towards the Absolute, come nearest to symbolizing 
its ways of uniting the many and the one." But for the pragmatist, "only in 
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so far as they ["intellectual products"] lead us, successfully or unsuccess-
fully, back into sensible experience again, are our abstracts and universals 
true or false at a l l . " 2 * He might have said the same for ar t . It had to have 
a practical function in the world of sensible experience. That the function 
had also to be ethical we know from his negative attitude toward over-indul-
gence in such things as "novel-reading, " "theatre-going, " the pleasures of 
music and the delights of historic Rome. And James 1 able use of such a r -
tistic techniques as the metaphor for the effects described above revealed 
his belief in the functional value of knowledge, morality, religion and the 
practice of ar t . 
v 
This pragmatic view that art needed to have value beyond that of pure 
pleasure is thoroughly consistent with William James ! view of psychology 
and religion as instruments for the improvement of the human condition. 
Consider as examples his interests in making ill people well or in making 
ignorant people knowledgeable, interests which certainly led him into the 
field of psychology and which probably began with the emotional illness which 
gripped him as a young man. 22 His study of psychology, he undoubtedly 
would have admitted, was good for his health; it helped him to be the bright 
and active kind of person he wanted to be; and, of course, it helped other 
people, his students and his readers , too. It was a study in which truth was 
not so much being discovered as created. But the effort of creativity was 
worthwhile if the truths it forged were effective in producing a better state 
of health—of character and knowledge. 
Consider, too, his apologia for religion. In the "Conclusions" to The 
Varieties of Religious Experience, James observed that all religions have 
in common (1) a certain "sense that there is something wrong about us as 
we naturally stand, " and (2) that 'Ve are saved from the wrongness by mak-
ing proper connection with the higher powers. " ^ And he continued: "But 
that which produces effects within another reality [within us] must be.termed 
a reality itself, so I feel as if we had no philosophic excuse for calling the 
unseen or mystical world unreal. . . . God is real since he produces real 
effects ." 2 4 Thus, in our sense of salvation from wrongness through our 
sense of "connection with the higher powers, " he argued, we find the justi-
fication for religion and the proof of God!s reality. 
In much the same way, James might have argued for the practice of 
ar t . The "aesthetic principles," the "ideal" patterns held in the mind, func-
tioned as the guide to "translation" of the "natural, " the bits of raw percep-
tual experience. Thus art was closely related to other human activities— 
psychology, philosophy and religion—in that it could be justified by its 
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usefulness in organizing human experience, in providing a very real salva-
tion within the maze of the actual human situation. 
Art, too, as James conceived of it, might function as a stimulant to 
ethical activity. This is precisely what he meant when in "Pragmatism and 
Religion" he commented on Whitman's poem "To You": 
O I could sing such glories and grandeurs about you; 
You have not known what you are—you have slumbered 
upon yourself all your life; . . . . 
You are he or she who is master or mis t ress over them, 
Master or mis t ress in your own right over Nature, ele-
ments, pain, passion, dissolution. 
Noting that the poem could be interpreted as meaning that one should "look 
back, lie back" on his own "true principle of being" and that "this is the fa-
mous way of quietism, of indifferentism, " the way to "the static One, " 
James then asserted that the interpretation of the pragmatist was other than 
this: "But pragmatism sees another way to be respected also, " he wrote, 
"the pluralistic way of interpreting the poem. The you so glorified, to which 
the hymn is sung, may mean your better possibilities phenomenally taken, 
or the specific redemptive effects even of your failures, upon yourself or 
others. It may mean your loyalty to the possibilities of others whom you 
admire and love so that you are willing to accept your own poor life, for it 
is that glory's pa r tne r . " 2 5 The ethical ring of such phrases as "better pos-
sibilities, " "specific redemptive effects" and "loyalty to the possibilities 
of others whom you admire and love" is unmistakable. Art taken as escape 
to the static One or as escape to pleasure for its own sake would lead inevi-
tably to a weakening of moral fiber: the Russian lady who let herself too 
much relax into the enjoyment of the drama was sure to forget her coach-
man shivering on his seat outside the theater. To avoid pointless pleasure 
and to improve the condition of one's own character by active and ethical 
living was of prime importance in James1 scheme of life. Toward this end 
art could serve a valuable function if one made use of his pleasure, if one 
put the "sentiments" excited by the aesthetic experience to practical, ethi-
cal work. 
Finally, James, as the writer has pointed out, mastered the techniques 
of style (1) for expressing his personal ideas and observations and (2) for 
pressing the reader toward reflection, commitment and action. He could 
use a metaphor, the comparison to a bird 's life, to describe his notion of 
the "stream of consciousness"; or he could, by comparing the situation of 
the agnostic of his day to a party of doomed skaters, force the reader to 
analyse his position and move toward an act of religious commitment or r e -
jection. Always, for James, ar t forms and artistic technique had to have 
function—a function of improving the human situation either by communicat-
ing knowledge of experience in psychology, philosophy, religion—or by 
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pushing the reader toward thoughts or commitments basic to ethical behav-
iour or religious vision. 
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